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TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE
Christopher A. Whytock*
INTRODUCTION
This Essay focuses on “transnational judicial governance”—that is, the
regulation of transnational activity by domestic courts.1 Specifically, the
Essay makes three points: First, transnational judicial governance is an
important form of global governance that interacts with, but is distinct from,
other forms of global governance such as international institutions,
transgovernmental networks, and private governance. Second, it appears
that the influence of U.S. courts in transnational judicial governance may be
declining as the transnational litigation system becomes increasingly
multipolar. Third, transnational judicial governance seems to be a
normatively mixed bag. But, for better or worse, it is likely that domestic
courts will continue to play an important role in global governance.
I. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE AND OTHER FORMS OF GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE
Legal scholars and political scientists have devoted considerable
attention to the role of domestic courts in domestic governance,2 as well as
to the role of international courts in global governance.3 So far, however,
*

Acting Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine
School of Law. This Essay is based on the author’s remarks at the symposium on
“Challenges to International Law, Challenges from International Law: New Realities and
the Global Order,” held at the St. John’s University School of Law, April 1, 2011. The
author thanks Christopher Borgen, Margaret McGuinness and Trea McPherson for
organizing the symposium, and Mark Movsesian for moderating the panel on global
economic regulation.
1
See Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 67, 71 (2009) [hereinafter Whytock, Domestic Courts] (defining “transnational
judicial governance”).
2
Examples of scholarship on the role of domestic courts in domestic governance
include RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS,
AND JUDICIALIZATION (2002); THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate
& Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
3
Examples of scholarship on the role of international courts in global governance
include KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 219–20 (2001) (emphasizing the
role of the European Court of Justice in European governance); COURTS CROSSING
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they have devoted little attention to the role of domestic courts in global
governance.4 Yet domestic courts are routinely involved in the regulation of
transnational activity.5 This section briefly discusses the important, but
often neglected, role of domestic courts in global governance, and
highlights the relationship between transnational judicial governance and
other forms of global governance.
A. The Global Governance Functions of Domestic Courts
Domestic courts perform two basic global governance functions: they
allocate authority to regulate transnational activity (a jurisdictional
function), and they determine rights and obligations of transnational actors
(a substantive function). These functions correspond to two fundamental
questions of global governance: Who governs? And who gets what?

BORDERS: BLURRING LINES OF SOVEREIGNTY (Mary L. Volcansek & John F. Stack, Jr.,
eds., 2005) (reviewing the role of international courts in world politics); Wayne Sandholtz
& Alec Stone Sweet, LAW, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, in THE POLITICS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004) (discussing global
governance implications of the European Court of Justice).
4
But see, e.g., Sarah Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law:
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65
INT’L ORG. 745 (2011) (positing a link between domestic courts’ application of
extraterritorial law and national policy implementation in other countries); Tonya L.
Putnam, Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the
Regulatory Sphere, 63 INT’L ORG. 459 (2009) (exploring how domestic courts have come
to regulate persons and conduct outside their states’ borders by claiming jurisdiction over
transactions with local and extraterritorial elements); Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra
note 1, at 75 (emphasizing two main functions of domestic courts in global governance:
allocating authority among states and determining rights and obligations of transnational
actors).
5
A closely related point is that the private international law (or “conflict of laws”)
principles applied by domestic courts play an important role in global governance. See
Karen Knop et al., Forward, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2008) (noting “connection
between private international law and global governance . . . that is largely ignored by
insider experts”); Horatia Muir-Watt, Private International Law as Global Governance:
Beyond the Schize, from Closet to Planet 7 (2011) (noting “governance potential of private
international law”), available at http://works.bepress.com/horatia_muir-watt/1; Christopher
A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
719, 735–43 (2009) [hereinafter Whytock, Myth of Mess] (analyzing global governance
functions of international choice of law).
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1. Who Governs? Allocation of Global Governance Authority
Transnational activity by definition has connections to more than one
state—either because citizens of more than one state are involved or
because the activity or its effects occur in more than one state’s territory. 6
These multi-state connections mean that more than one state may claim the
authority to govern that activity.7 Which of these states should govern? This
“who governs” question has three basic dimensions, corresponding to three
different types of governance authority: prescriptive authority (Which
state’s laws should govern particular transnational activity?), adjudicative
authority (Which state’s courts should adjudicate disputes arising out of that
activity?), and enforcement authority (Which state should enforce a law or
court decision that applies to transnational activity?).8
Domestic courts help answer these questions. For example, when U.S.
courts decide whether to apply U.S. statutes extraterritorially, or when they
make international choice-of-law decisions, they help allocate prescriptive
authority.9 When they decide whether to assert personal jurisdiction over a
defendant or whether to grant a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss a
suit in favor of a foreign court, they help allocate adjudicative authority.10
And when they decide whether to give extraterritorial effect to subpoenas
issued by U.S. regulatory agencies or injunctions issued by U.S. courts, they
help allocate enforcement authority.11
6

See STEVEN VERTOVEC, TRANSNATIONALISM 2 (Routledge ed., 2009) (discussing the
“cross-border relationships, patterns of exchange, affiliations and social formations
spanning nation-states” and how the growth of interest in transnationalism parallels the
growth of social scientific interest in globalization over the same period).
7
See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Building Capacity for the Transnational Regulation of
Migration, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (2010) (examining the U.S.-Mexico relationship and
conflicting interests in controlling governance of transnational activity, particularly drug
trafficking and other cross-border crimes).
8
These three types of governance authority correspond to the three basic categories of
jurisdiction under international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987) (defining prescriptive jurisdiction as a state’s
jurisdiction “to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or
the interests of persons in things”; adjudicative jurisdiction as a state’s jurisdiction “to
subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals”; and
enforcement jurisdiction as a state’s jurisdiction “to induce or compel compliance or to
punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations”).
9
See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 80–81 (explaining that domestic
courts help allocate prescriptive authority by deciding whether to apply domestic law
extraterritorially and by making international choice-of-law decisions).
10
See id. at 77–80 (explaining how courts help allocate adjudicative authority by
applying personal jurisdiction doctrine, the forum non conveniens doctrine, and other
doctrines).
11
See id. at 81–83 (explaining how courts help allocate enforcement authority); see
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In addition to this “horizontal” inter-state dimension of allocation,
domestic courts help allocate governance authority “vertically” between
domestic and international institutions. For example, when U.S. courts
decide whether a treaty is self-executing, whether to recognize a principle of
customary international law, or whether to give priority to domestic or
international law in the event of a conflict between the two, they help
allocate governance authority along this domestic-international dimension.12
Domestic courts also help allocate governance authority along a third,
private-public dimension. For example, by determining whether to apply
non-state norms such as commercial usages or lex mercatoria on the one
hand, or state law on the other hand, they influence whether private or
public rules will govern transnational activity; and by determining whether
to enforce an arbitration agreement, they can influence whether a private
arbitrator or a public court will exercise adjudicative authority over a
transnational dispute.13
In summary, domestic courts perform a jurisdictional global governance
function by helping to allocate three types of governance authority over
transnational activity: prescriptive authority, adjudicative authority, and
enforcement authority. They do so along three dimensions: between states,
between domestic and international institutions, and between private and
public actors. Globalization entails increased transnational activity over
which multiple states may have legitimate claims to govern. 14 Moreover,
with the spread of international law and international courts, there are
difficult choices to make about whether they or domestic institutions should
govern particular transnational activity. Likewise, with private actors
also FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315–17
(D.C.Cir. 1980) (explaining the limitations on courts’ enforcement jurisdiction and the
distinction between the power to create laws that prescribe certain conduct and the
authority to enforce those prescriptive rules); S.E.C. v. Sabhlok, 2009 WL 3561523, at *5–
6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009) (recognizing limitations on jurisdiction to enforce a Walsh Act
subpoena).
12
See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 83–88 (explaining how these
decisions help allocate authority along this vertical dimension).
13
See id. at 89–90 (explaining how these decisions help allocate authority between
state and non-state actors). See also Jones v. Sea Tow Servs. Freeport NY Inc., 30 F.3d
360, 366 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing an order compelling arbitration, finding it improper
where an arbitration clause selected English law and an English forum, both parties were
U.S. citizens, and the vessel in question was salvaged from U.S. waters); see also
Matabang v. Carnival Corp., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1366–67 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (denying a
motion to compel arbitration ).
14
See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 90 (noting that “[b]ecause
transnational activity by definition has connections to more than one state, more than one
state may have a basis for legitimately exercising the authority to govern it”).
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increasingly claiming authority to govern transnational activity traditionally
governed by states, the allocation of governance authority between private
and public institutions also poses serious challenges.15 As a result, the
jurisdictional function of domestic courts in global governance is likely to
be of growing importance.
2. Who Gets What? Determination of Rights and Obligations of
Transnational Actors
It is well understood that domestic courts are important in domestic
governance not only because they resolve discrete disputes—itself a critical
governance function—but also because when they do so, they contribute to
the authoritative allocation of resources within a society.16 Domestic courts
perform a similar function in global governance by determining rights and
obligations of transnational actors.17
Neither legal scholars nor political scientists have systematically
explored the implications of this judicial function for global governance.
But existing research on three types of transnational litigation demonstrates
its importance. In transnational regulatory litigation, domestic courts apply
domestic regulatory norms to determine rights and obligations of
transnational actors.18 In transnational public law litigation, “[p]rivate
individuals, government officials, and nations sue one another directly, and
are sued directly, in a variety of judicial fora, most prominently, domestic
courts,” based on rights derived from both domestic and international law.19
And in transnational private litigation, domestic courts resolve transnational
disputes under different states’ private law rules—such as rules governing
torts, contracts and property—rules that reflect these states’ respective
distributive and regulatory policies.20
15

See THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 4–7
(Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas Biersteker eds., 2002) (highlighting the rise of private
power in global governance).
16
See Martin Shapiro, From Public Law to Public Policy, or the “Public” in “Public
Law,” 5 POL. SCI. & POL. 410, 413 (1972) (discussing “judicial allocation of values”); see
also Robert M. Cover, Dispute Resolution: A Foreword, 88 YALE L.J. 910, 911 (1979)
(noting that courts both solve disputes and distribute resources).
17
See Janet Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina:
Problem or Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 281, 321 (1999) (illustrating how
domestic courts can determine rights and obligations of transnational actors in the human
rights context).
18
See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J.
INT’L L. 251 (2006) (defining and discussing transnational regulatory litigation).
19
See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE
L.J. 2347 (1991) (defining and discussing transnational public law litigation).
20
See generally Robert Wai, Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational
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Notwithstanding the differences between these different types of
transnational litigation, in all three contexts one sees domestic courts
performing a substantive global governance function: the determination of
rights and obligations in ways that contribute to the authoritative allocation
of resources among transnational actors.21 In this way, domestic courts help
answer a second fundamental question of global governance: Who gets
what?
B. The Transnational Shadow of the Law: Strategic Behavior and Other
Forms of Global Governance
The global governance functions of domestic courts are important not
only because of their impact on litigants, but also because of their influence
beyond borders and beyond the parties to particular disputes.22 Extending
Mnookin and Kornhauser’s concept, I call this the “transnational shadow of
the law.”23
1. Transnational Judicial Governance and the Strategic Behavior of
Transnational Actors
For example, domestic court decisions can affect the strategic behavior
of transnational actors. Prior court decisions influence actors’ expectations
about future court decisions. Because the strategic behavior of transnational
actors often depends on their expectations about future domestic court
decisions regarding their activity, domestic court decisions can influence
Governance, in CRITICIZING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 243 (Markus Lederer & Philipp S.
Müller eds. 2005) (defining and discussing transnational private litigation).
21
See Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering In a Contested
Global Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 471, 474 (2005) (discussing how domestic courts
redistribute resources between actors in private litigation); Whytock, Domestic Courts,
supra note 1, at 91–96 (arguing that one of the basic global governance functions of
domestic courts is the determination of rights and obligations of transnational actors).
22
See Buxbaum, supra note 18, at 254 (arguing that domestic courts influence the
transnational process on a global scale by recognizing and enforcing international norms);
Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow of the
Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 449, 453 (2008) (arguing that “transnational litigation is
the foundation of a form of global governance, whereby judges make decisions that not
only directly affect the parties to particular disputes, but also indirectly regulate the
behavior of actors who engage in activity in the transnational shadow of the law”).
23
See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951, 972–73 (1979) (describing the “shadow of the
law” concept in domestic context); Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at pt. III
(extending concept to transnational activity).

Winter 2012] TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE

61

that activity.24 For example, international choice-of-law decisions by
domestic courts can influence transnational activity by helping transnational
actors determine which state’s laws would be applied to their activity in the
event of litigation—and, in the same way, these decisions can facilitate
bargaining among transnational actors.25 Similarly, the personal jurisdiction
and forum non conveniens decisions of a particular state’s domestic courts
can influence forum shopping behavior by shaping litigants’ expectations
about whether a suit would be able to proceed in that state.26
2. The Relationship Between Transnational Judicial Governance and Other
Types of Global Governance
Of course, transnational judicial governance is only one possible
method of global governance. But the transnational shadow of the law
extends to other forms of governance. The most familiar (even if not the
most pervasive) approach to global governance involves international
institutions, such as international law (e.g. the law of the sea), international
organizations (e.g. the United Nations), and international courts (e.g. the
International Court of Justice).27
Another method of global governance consists of transgovernmental
networks between the regulatory agencies of different states.28
24

See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 98–101 (explaining impact of
domestic court decisions on the strategic behavior of transnational actors). See also Samuel
P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U. PA. INT’L ECON. L. 1297,
1306 (2004) (discussing the interplay between lawmaking and transnational actors and how
procedural choices of courts can influence transnational activity).
25
See Whytock, Myth of Mess, supra note 5, at 742; see also Ralf Michaels, Two
Economists, Three Opinions? Economic Models for Private International Law - CrossBorder Torts as Example, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
143, 156 (Jurgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006) (noting that the predictability of
applicable law may enable parties to either settle in light of the particular applicable law or
litigate regardless of the choice of law).
26
See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 481, 487 (2011) [hereinafter Whytock, Forum Shopping] (explaining that, other
things being equal, plaintiffs are more likely to file in a particular court if they expect that
the particular court will make a favorable court access ruling).
27
See Jose E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-maker, 31 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 591 (2005) (emphasizing the importance and “practical significance”
of international organizations in global governance); see also Katrina C. Szakal, Manual
on International Courts and Tribunals, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 858, 858 (2000)
(observing that international adjudicatory authorities have jurisdiction over a variety of
areas of law and that use of these authorities to resolve international disputes has become
increasingly common).
28
See Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of
International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 216 (2003) (discussing the
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Transgovernmental networks are “pattern[s] of regular and purposive
relations among like government units working across . . . borders.”29 An
example of a transgovernmental network is the active cooperative
relationship between antitrust authorities in the United States and the
European Union.30 Transnational judicial governance itself may sometimes
take the form of transgovernmental networks, particularly at the highest
levels of national judiciaries.31 However, it is likely that most domestic
judges—especially the busy trial court judges on the front lines of
transnational litigation—usually will have insufficient time and resources to
actively participate in networks of regular and purposive relations with their
foreign counterparts.32 Therefore, it is likely that most transnational judicial
governance occurs outside the context of transgovernmental networks.
A third approach to global governance is private global governance,
whereby private actors regulate transnational activity.33 For example,
private actors play an important role in international standard setting,34 and

reasons transgovernmental networks are often thought to be the most efficient means of
global governance). See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER
(2004) (describing transgovernmental networks).
29
See SLAUGHTER, supra note 28, at 14 (defining transgovernmental networks as
regular and constructive relations among like governments working across borders).
30
See Christopher A. Whytock, A Rational Design Theory of Transgovernmentalism:
The Case of E.U.-U.S. Merger Review Cooperation, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 39–43 (2005)
(explaining the transgovernmental relationship between antitrust authorities in the United
States and the European Union).
31
See SLAUGHTER, supra note 28, at 34 (discussing transgovernmental networks of
judges).
32
However, U.S. bankruptcy judges sometimes directly engage with their foreign
counterparts in global bankruptcy cases. See id. at 94–96 (noting that U.S. bankruptcy
judges sometimes directly engage with their foreign counterparts in global bankruptcy
cases).
33
See Morton Ougaard, Private Institutions and Business Power in Global
Governance, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 387, 387 (2008) (noting the influence private
actors have on global governance and standard setting). See generally Special Issue,
Private Regulation in the Global Economy, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3 (2010),
http://www.bepress .com/bap/vol12/iss3/ (conceptualizing and describing examples of
private governance).
34
See Eyal Benvenisti, The Move from Institutions? Substituting International Law,
100 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 289, 292 (2006) (discussing instances where private actors
have coordinated to regulate international action); THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE
AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 15 (discussing the increased influence
private actors have on international governance standards). See generally Tim Büthe &
Walter Mattli, Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the
Public Interest, 18 GOVERNANCE 399 (2005) (analyzing private global standard setting in
accounting).
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private arbitral institutions offer dispute resolution services that are widely
used by transnational actors.35
Even combined, these methods of global governance do not extend to
all transnational activity. But activity to which these international,
transgovernmental and private governance methods do not extend are not
necessarily ungoverned. To the contrary, they may be governed by domestic
law—and when this is the case, domestic courts, as explained above, can
help determine which state’s domestic law governs.36 Even when one of
these three methods of global governance do apply to particular
transnational activity, they may overlap with domestic regulations—here,
too, domestic courts can play a significant role by allocating authority along
the domestic-international dimension or the private-public dimension.37 In
these ways, domestic courts can help fill global governance gaps and
resolve governance conflicts.
More fundamentally, these other methods of global governance depend
significantly on domestic courts for their effectiveness.38 For example,
domestic courts can support efforts to govern through international
institutions by contributing to the development of international law;39 and
they can support (or limit) those efforts by enforcing (or declining to
enforce) international law and the judgments of international courts.40
35

See MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS &
JUDICIALIZATION 334 (2002) (noting that private parties increasingly use private arbitration
to resolve disputes that arise from trans-border commercial activity); Christopher A.
Whytock, Private-Public Interaction in Global Governance: The Case of Transnational
Commercial Arbitration, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3, 5–8 (2010), available at
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art10/ [hereinafter Whytock, Private-Public
Interaction] (empirically documenting the rise of transnational commercial arbitration).
36
See supra Part I.A.1.
37
See supra Part I.A.1; see also Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the “New”
Schools: Assessing the Legitimacy of International Legal Norms Created by Domestic
Courts, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 455, 458 (2007) (discussing the importance of domestic courts
in the transnational legal process).
38
For a more detailed discussion of how domestic courts can support (or hinder) other
methods of global governance, see Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 103–14.
39
See BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
LEGAL SYSTEMS 104 (René Provost trans., 1993) (noting that domestic courts add a greater
body of case law to the interpretation of treaties than do international tribunals); see also
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV.
99, 137 (1994) (positing that a unified commitment by judicial institutions is more likely to
establish international rule of law than a single international court).
40
See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 104–11 (explaining how domestic
courts can support or hinder governance through international law and international
courts); see also Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: the Role of
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO.
L.J. 487, 501 (2005) (finding that participation of domestic courts in the transnational
judicial dialogue plays a significant role in the creation of international legal norms).
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Insofar as domestic courts are involved in the interpretation, application and
review of the regulations and other decisions of government agencies that
are part of transgovernmental networks, domestic courts can provide
support for those networks. And domestic courts support private global
governance by interpreting and enforcing transnational contracts. 41 In
particular, they provide critical support for the transnational commercial
arbitration system by enforcing arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.42
Of course, these alternative forms of governance do not rely entirely or
necessarily even primarily on domestic courts. But domestic courts can
enhance the effectiveness of these alternative methods by providing
support, and can sometimes hinder them by withholding support.
In summary, the effects of domestic court decisions in transnational
litigation radiate beyond borders and beyond the parties to particular
lawsuits.43 Domestic courts not only influence the strategic behavior of
transnational actors, but also provide support for other methods of global
governance, including international institutions, transgovernmental
networks, and private governance.
II. INCREASING MULTIPOLARITY IN TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL
GOVERNANCE?
What is the role of the United States in transnational judicial
governance? The conventional wisdom is that, for a variety of reasons, the
United States is the leading provider of courts and law for transnational
disputes, perhaps along with England. Thus, the general impression seems
to be that the transnational litigation system is unipolar, or perhaps bipolar.
This would imply that the United States is among the most influential
participants in transnational judicial governance.
But several empirical trends seem to indicate that other countries are
playing an increasingly influential role in the transnational litigation system.
41

See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 111–14 (explaining how domestic
courts can support or hinder governance through private institutions, including private
contracting and transnational arbitration).
42
See Christopher R. Drahozal, Penn State Law Review Symposium: Building the
Civilization of Arbitration: Private Ordering and International Commercial Arbitration,
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1031, 1040 (2009) (arguing that public courts play an important role
in the process of enforcing international arbitration awards); Whytock, Private-Public
Interaction, supra note 35, at 18–22 (explaining how domestic courts help solve
enforcement problems in transnational commercial arbitration).
43
Cf. Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT
COURTS 117, 121 (Keith O. Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983) (referring to “[t]he
[r]adiating [e]ffects of [c]ourts” in the domestic context).
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These trends suggest that compared to other states, the influence of the
United States in transnational judicial governance may be declining.
First, according to data collected by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, alienage litigation—that is, transnational litigation over which
federal subject matter jurisdiction exists because the suit is between a U.S.
citizen and a foreign citizen—is declining.44 Transnational tort claims are
declining, which would seem to suggest less ex post forum shopping into
U.S. courts by plaintiffs;45 and transnational contract claims are likewise
declining, which would seem to suggest fewer ex ante forum selection
clauses favoring U.S. courts.46 The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in
J.M. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro47—which rejected personal
jurisdiction in a suit by a U.S. plaintiff against a foreign defendant for an
injury caused in New Jersey by a machine manufactured by the
defendant48—suggests that this trend will continue.
Second, there is evidence of a growing number of foreign judgments
being brought to the United States for enforcement. Unfortunately, there is
not good data on foreign judgment enforcement in the United States. But
analysis of opinions published in Westlaw by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York indicates an overall upward trend between
1990 and 2009.49 This trend is consistent with the observations of
transnational litigators who have identified foreign judgment enforcement
as a growing field of legal practice in the United States.50 If there is indeed
an increase in foreign judgments, this would seem to suggest an underlying
44

See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J.
INT’L L. 31, 34 (2011) (illustrating in a chart that alienage suits involving torts and contract
claims have experienced an overall decline in the period from 1996 to 2005).
45
Whytock, Forum Shopping, supra note 26, at 510–11 (emphasizing that if there is a
wave of foreign plaintiffs in the U.S. federal court system, it is not a result of alienage
claims).
46
See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 44, at 33 (stating that “the decline in
transnational contract claims suggests that the world’s commercial actors may be
negotiating fewer forum selection clauses that provide for litigation in the United States.”).
47
131 U.S. 2780, 2792 (2011).
48
Id. (concluding that New Jersey did not have personal jurisdiction over petitioner).
49
See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 44, at 36–37.
50
See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 1078 (4th ed. 2007) (noting “increasingly frequent efforts by
courts and legislatures around the world to impose substantial judgments against
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increase in transnational litigation in foreign courts. Moreover, this trend
would suggest that if U.S. courts in some ways function as “world courts,”51
they may increasingly be perceived less as the world’s trial courts and more
as the world’s appellate courts as they review the judgments of foreign
courts to decide whether they are enforceable.52
Third, there is evidence that U.S. courts are applying the law of other
countries with increasing frequency. Contrary to the conventional wisdom,
recent empirical analysis suggests that U.S. judges making international
choice-of-law decisions are not systematically biased in favor of U.S. law.53
Moreover, an analysis of decisions of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York shows a steady increase since 1990 in the
number of references to Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which is the rule governing determinations of foreign law.54 This trend
suggests that even when U.S. courts do adjudicate transnational disputes,
foreign law is increasingly being applied to govern the underlying
transnational activity.
These are just snapshots of discrete trends—but together they provide
some support for the conjecture that transnational judicial governance has
been, and will continue to be, increasingly multipolar.
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See Ralf Michaels, U.S. Courts as World Courts, 12 WASEDA PROCEEDINGS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW (2009), available at http://wine.wul.waseda.ac.jp/record=b2576729
*eng.
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courts risk “in effect giv[ing] the judgment [debtor] a further appeal on the merits”).
Ordinarily, however, the review of foreign judgments by U.S. courts is far less searching
than appellate review of lower court decisions within the U.S. legal system. See generally
Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra B. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, pt. I.B (2011) (discussing
the judgment enforcement doctrine).
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See Whytock, Myth of Mess, supra note 5, at 764–69 (providing empirical evidence
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See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 44, at 38 (empirically documenting this
increase). Rule 44.1 provides as follows: “A party who intends to raise an issue about a
foreign country’s law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In determining
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44.1.
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III. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE: FOR BETTER OR WORSE?
Is it a good thing that domestic courts play an important role in global
governance? On the one hand, at least in the more “high politics” world of
foreign relations law, there are plausible arguments to be made that courts
are not institutionally well suited to get involved in transnational matters.
On the other hand, empirical research suggests that U.S. district court
judges do a surprisingly good job applying frustratingly vague principles of
transnational litigation, including choice-of-law principles and the forum
non conveniens doctrine.55 Empirical evidence also suggests that while
generally staying true to the U.S. Supreme Court’s pro-enforcement policy
in arbitration, U.S. judges also appear to take seriously their role in
supervising the transnational arbitration system.56 Moreover, U.S. judges do
not appear to carry out these governance functions in a manner that is
strongly influenced by partisan or ideological biases.57 This is not to say
that domestic courts are necessarily the best suited institutions for making
global governance decisions. But in the absence of other governance
institutions—international, transgovernmental or private—transnational
judicial governance may end up filling some of the gaps.58
Second, aside from whether transnational judicial governance in general
is a good thing, is increased multipolarity in transnational judicial
governance—the trend suggested in Part II—a good thing? On the one
hand, from a U.S. perspective, one might lament a decline in the influence
of U.S. courts and U.S. law in global governance. On the other hand, this
may be seen as good news for other states that previously exerted relatively
little influence in the governance of transnational activity. Moreover,
55
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arbitration in a manner that helps reinforce arbitration’s status as the leading method of
transnational dispute resolution).
57
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that even if ideological factors influence judge’s choice-of-law decisions, the influence is
rather small when compared to other factors); see also Whytock, Forum Shopping System,
supra note 26 at 525–26 (finding that a judge’s ideology may affect the factors emphasized
in a forum non conveniens decision, but that ideology does not appear to have a strong
impact on the probability of dismissal in general).
58
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prevalent role domestic courts will play in the absence of supranational governance
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business-oriented interest groups, like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
have been fighting for years to reduce the flow of transnational litigation
into U.S. courts and limit the application of U.S. tort law to transnational
activity because of concerns about the negative impact on U.S. and U.S.based businesses.59 For them, perhaps the declining role of the United States
might be viewed as good news. But it is far from clear that these businesses
will ultimately find foreign courts and foreign law more beneficial.60
The bottom line is that, for better or worse, domestic courts play an
important role in global governance, and it is likely that they will continue
to do so even if the influence of U.S. courts is declining. It is therefore
important for legal scholars, political scientists and policymakers to develop
a better understanding of transnational judicial governance.
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See Michael D. Goldhaber, Forum Shopper’s Remorse, CORP. COUNS., Apr. 1, 2010,
available at http://www.corpcounsel.com (describing how defendants sometimes regret
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